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Abstract 
We estimate a negative binomial model with fixed effects to examine the impact of spatial 
differences in environmental regulation on manufacturing capital flows. Using a newly available 
data set, we find that stricter air quality standards with respect to ozone deter births of polluting 
plants, suggesting heterogeneity in regulatory standards may create a spatial browning process. 
We also find that spatial differences in environmental regulation do not play a role in the location 
decision of non-pollution intensive plants. Finally, we also examine the capital flow impacts with 
respect to three other criteria air pollutants regulated under the amendments to the Clean Air 
Act. We find that births of particulates-intensive-manufacturers are deterred by stricter 
regulation with respect to particulates emissions but the location decisions of high emitting 
carbon monoxide and sulfur dioxide plants are not significantly impacted by increased 
regulation of the respective criteria pollutant.   
Introduction 
Prior to the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970, environmental 
regulation control was in the hands of state and local authorities. Opponents of local 
control over environmental regulation contested that this created a “race to the bottom” 
phenomenon where local legislators had incentives to set sub-optimum environmental 
regulatory standards in an attempt to attract polluting industries to the area. The 
decentralized status of air quality regulation and rising ambient concentration levels led 
to Congress creating administrative bodies such as the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) and the Council on Environmental Quality to enforce new regulatory statutes. The 
EPA created national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) under the newly formed 3 
 
National Environmental Policy Act and amendments to the Clean Air Act (CAA), 
designed to clean up source emissions for air pollution in the United States. 
 
Since this time, an academic debate has emerged regarding whether a relationship exists 
between federal air quality regulations and the capital flows of pollution-intensive 
manufacturing plants. The intuition behind the debate is that if spatial heterogeneity in 
environmental regulatory standards creates significant differences in private compliance 
costs, then these costs should be factored into a firm’s location decision. As such, 
pollution-intensive manufacturers may be deterred from opening a new plant in areas 
with stricter regulations. Much of the earlier research suggests that, at most, any 
relationship between environmental regulation stringency and the location decision of 
pollution-intensive births is negligible (see Bartik 1988; McConnel and Schwab 1990; 
Duffy-Deno 1992; Jaffe et al. 1995; and Levinson 1996). However, more recent work 
specifically considers the impact of the CAA on the capital flows of pollution-intensive 
manufacturers and typically finds that increased regulatory standards deters pollution 
intensive births (see List et al. 1999; Becker and Henderson 2000; List 2001; and List et 
al. 2004a; Becker 2005). 
 
Under the CAA, each year every county in the U.S. is designated as being either in-
attainment or out-of-attainment with regard to federal air quality standards for each of six 
criteria pollutants. The six criteria air pollutants are tropospheric ozone (O3), particulates 
(PT), carbon monoxide (CO), sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), and lead 
(Pb). Under the CAA, new plants are subject to significantly different start-up costs 4 
 
dependent on the attainment status of the county. Firms locating new plants in a county 
designated as being out-of-attainment are subject to the Lowest Achievable Emission 
Rate (LAER) on equipment. Regulatory compliance is enforced without any cost 
consideration to the firm and can entail significant start-up costs. These costs can 
comprise additional capital expenditures on air pollution abatement (APA) equipment 
and/or operating costs on new staff or more expensive materials. In contrast, 
 firms locating new plants within in-attainment counties that are subject to a less 
restrictive regulatory standard known as Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD). 
In this case, only firms that have the potential to emit more than 100 tons of a criteria 
pollutant (Class A polluters) in a year must install the Best Available Control Technology 
(BACT), where the cost burden on the firm is taken into account in the decision making 
process. Further, low-polluting firms are not subject to regulatory standards in areas 
designated as in-attainment. Overall, local regulators have discretion in the methods they 
choose to bring non-attainment areas into attainment as they target “dirty” industries, 
however, it is the firms themselves that are directly regulated, not the industries.  
 
For an example of the recent work examining the firm behavioral impacts of the CAA 
and NAAQS non-attainment status, Becker and Henderson (2000) consider 
manufacturing plant location from 1963 to 1992 and find that ozone air quality 
regulations significantly reduce the number of births of high emitters in non-attainment 
areas relative to attainment areas. List and McHone (2000) use county-level annual ozone 
attainment status as their measure of air quality regulation and consider county-level 
plant births in New York State from 1980 to 1990. They find that a county’s ozone status 5 
 
change from attainment to non-attainment does significantly reduce births of “dirty” 
plants. Further, Kahn (1997) finds 14% lower growth in manufacturing births of plants 
considered high emitters of PT between 1982 and 1988. Finally, Becker (2005) takes a 
different approach to other firm behavior studies by examining the impact of stricter 
regulations under the CAA on air pollution abatement (APA) capital expenditures and 
operating costs.  As the Census Bureau’s Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures 
(PACE) survey data are frequently used as proxies for regulatory stringency in firm 
location studies, the overall purpose of the study was to test whether underlying PACE 
survey responses are correlated with environmental stringency measures. Becker (2005) 
considers four of the CAA’s criteria air pollutants in a probit and tobit model framework. 
Results from the logit model indicate that generally, heavy emitters of the criteria 
pollutants had a greater likelihood of non-zero APA expenditures. Further, results from 
the tobit model specification show that these heavy emitters are faced with APA 
expenditures in the region of hundreds of thousands of dollars.  
 
Overall, recent research examining firm behavior in relation to county-level NAAQS 
non-attainment status provides evidence that greater environmental stringency deters 
births of pollution-intensive manufacturers. These results have important policy 
implications as it suggests that federal air quality regulations have unintended 
consequences stemming from the CAA by altering regional capital formation. If 
environmental regulations are an important consideration in pollution-intensive 
manufacturers’ site location decisions, this may create a spatial browning process as 6 
 
polluting manufacturers are less likely to site new plants in areas with increased start-up 
costs. 
 
The purpose of this research is to use a newly available county-specific data set on 
establishment births to examine the impact of air quality regulation on the location 
decisions of pollution-intensive manufacturing plants across the U.S. Following research 
by Becker and Henderson (2000), List and McHone (2000), and List et al. (2003), we are 
primarily interested in examining the firm location impacts of increased regulatory 
standards with respect to ozone under the CAA. We focus on ozone for three main 
reasons. First, as discussed by List et al. (2004a), of the six criteria pollutants, ozone has 
attracted the most regulatory attention due to the limited success in reducing its 
concentration levels in the U.S. Second, List and McHone (2000) reason that as 
attainment status for the criteria pollutants can include partial standards between 
attainment and non-attainment, county-level ozone status has been typically polar in 
nature with counties either specifically in- or out-of-attainment. Finally, of all the criteria 
pollutants, more counties have been designated as out-of-attainment with respect to ozone 
emissions. However, to expand the analysis, following Becker (2005), we also examine 
manufacturing firms’ location behavior with regard to other criteria pollutants. In total, 
we consider four of the six criteria pollutants; ozone, PT, CO, and SO2. County non-
attainment status effects with regard to NO2 emissions are not tested as there are very few 
counties in a non-attainment status during the studied time period. Also, we do not test 
county non-attainment status effects vis-à-vis airborne lead as county lead attainment 
status was not listed in the Code of Federal Regulations during this time period. As 7 
 
Becker (2005) points out, it is also highly unlikely that any counties were in non-
attainment status with regard to lead emissions, as in May 2004, only a portion of three 
counties were categorized as such. 
 
Our estimates from a fixed effects negative binomial model indicate that the expected 
number of pollution-intensive plant openings decreases by approximately nine percent 
each year that a county is out-of-attainment with respect to ozone standards. As the set-up 
costs imposed by the LAER standards significantly detract births of polluting 
manufacturers away from non-attainment counties, we hypothesize that clean births will 
not be impacted by spatial differences in regulation. In terms of ozone attainment status, 
results from a non pollution-intensive model support this hypothesis. Results from 
models examining the impacts of non-attainment status with regard to the other criteria 
pollutants are mixed. We find that county-level non-attainment status with regard to PT 
emissions also deters births of heavy PT emitting manufacturers but the location 
decisions of high emitting CO and SO2 plants are not significantly impacted by a 
county’s non-attainment status of the respective pollutant. 
 
Data
We develop a county-level panel data set on establishment births and deaths from 1996 to 
2000, across all counties in the contiguous United States.  The data are collected under 
the Statistics of U.S. Businesses program at the U.S. Census Bureau.  Establishment data 
are compared against the prior year to discern whether the business is new, i.e. a birth, or 
continuing.  The data are verified to ensure that businesses that are merely renamed are 8 
 
not counted as new.  The births data are arranged as inter-year flows, e.g. establishment 
births between 1996 and 1997.  Each establishment is coded by geography and industry 
(Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)).  This provides a level of detail beyond most 
comparable studies, plus the micro level panel data set also avoids many of the data 
constraints and estimation biases apparent in previous studies. For example, the panel 
nature of our data set avoids the limitations and biases that are inherent in previous cross-
sectional studies. These studies typically find an insignificant, or at best, a marginal 
relationship between environmental regulation stringency and firm location decisions. 
However, more recent studies have highlighted the failure of cross-sectional models to 
properly control for the simultaneous nature of firm location and pollution problems (for 
example, see List and McHone 2000; and Brunnermeier and Levinson, 2004).  
Essentially, cross-sectional studies consider differences in environmental regulations 
across counties at one point in time. As such, cross-sectional models do not fully 
disentangle the positive correlation between environmental regulation, higher pollution 
levels, and more stringent regulation. As a result, coefficient estimates are likely biased. 
In contrast, the use of panel data allows the analysis to consider differences in new firm 
births in a county over time as a function of variation in the county’s environmental 
regulation over the same period. As panel models can also control for county-specific 
fixed effects, we are able to overcome the limitations of previous cross-sectional studies. 
 
Other advantages of this data set over earlier studies accrue from the micro level data on 
establishment births. For example, due to data limitations, some earlier studies used 
aggregate measures of establishment data and changes in the stock of plants as the 9 
 
dependent variable. As environmental regulatory measures based on attainment status are 
more stringent toward new plants locating in the area, use of aggregate plant stock data 
may miss the regulatory effects on the flow of plant births. Our data set uses plant births 
as the measure on changes in manufacturing establishments, which will be more sensitive 
to changes in environmental regulation at the county level. Also, many previous studies 
employ data from the Census of Manufacturing database that is only available every five 
years (Levinson 1996; Becker and Henderson 2000; and List 2001). Therefore, to 
generate the independent variable, plant births are aggregated across five-year intervals. 
However, as plants can open and close within the five-year time period, the temporal 
aggregation of births has potential problems in missing new plants that open and shut 
down within the five-year window. 
 
Finally, the data allow us to also analyze the relationship between environmental 
regulation stringency and firm location, by pollution-intensity of manufacturing sectors. 
As the county-level attainment status is determined by air quality measures, we follow 
previous research by Greenstone (2002) and List (2004a) by focusing on a set of 
pollution-intensive industrial sectors based on their ozone emission levels. Greenstone 
(2002) classifies sectors as ozone pollution intensive if they emit at least 6% of the total 
sector’s emissions of the primary chemical precursors to ozone.
1 As establishment data 
are disaggregated by SIC code, we consider plants as being pollution-intensive if they are 
in the following SIC codes: 2611-31 (Pulp and Paper Mills), 2711-89 (Printing and 
Binding), 2812-19 (Industrial Inorganic Chemicals), 2911 (Petroleum Refining), 30 
(Rubber and Misc. Plastics), 32 (Stone, Clay, and Glass), 3312-13 (Steel and 
                                                 
1 Namely, volatile organic compounds and nitrogen oxide. 10 
 
Electrometallurgical Products), 3321-25 (Iron and Steel Foundries), 34 (Fabricated Metal 
Products), and 371 (Motor Vehicles and Equipment). All other industries are coded as 
non pollution-intensive.  
 
We also follow Becker (2005) by examining three other criteria air pollutants: 
particulates (PT), carbon monoxide (CO), and sulfur dioxide (SO2). However, while 
Becker (2005) examines PACE survey data to investigate the effects of the CAA on 
plants’ capital expenditures and operating costs, we investigate increased regulatory 
stringency on high emitters of these criteria air pollutants in a more traditional firm 
location analysis. Appendix 1 provides a breakdown of industries considered high 
emitters of PT, CO, and SO2.  
With regard to PT, CO, and SO2, we follow Becker (2005) by categorizing high emitters 
based on data from the EPA’s Aerometric Information Retrieval System (AIRS) 
database. AIRS data are also classified by SIC and detail U.S. establishments that emit a 
threshold amount of each of the six criteria air pollutants. For CO, the threshold is set at 
1,000 tons per year. For all others, it is 100 tons per year. As threshold levels for each 
criteria pollutant are set by the EPA, Becker (2005) calculates the number of 
establishments that emit over the threshold level. An industry (and therefore any plant 
that operates within that industry) is labeled as a high emitter of each pollutant if it has a 
minimum number of plants above the threshold level. In each case, the minimum number 
of establishments was set so that no more than 50% of plants were designated as a high 
emitter of any pollutant.  
 11 
 
In terms of ozone, there are 325 counties that are designated as out-of-attainment over the 
four-year period (Table 1). The majority of these counties are located in Pennsylvania 
(44), California (27), and Ohio (25). Of the 325 counties, over this time frame 68 
counties changed status from out-of-attainment to attainment between 1996 and 2000. 
For PT, 78 counties were designated as out-of-attainment over the four-year period with 
the majority of counties located in California (11), Colorado (11), and Montana (7). Of 
these counties, only five changed attainment status over this time. There were 112 out-of-
attainment counties with respect to CO with California (22), New Jersey (14), and 
Colorado (9) contributing most counties. Of these, 47 counties changes status over this 
time. Finally, 45 counties were designated as out-of-attainment with regard to S02 with 
the majority of counties located in Minnesota (8), Ohio (7), and Indiana (5). Of these, 16 
counties changed status of the period 1996 to 2000.   
 
Table 2 displays the counties with the greatest number of establishment births by type of 
firm (all births, ozone-polluting, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide).  Certain counties 
reappear in each ranking, for example, Los Angeles, New York, and Orange Counties.  
  
Table 3 reports the number of establishment births by pollutant.  Particulate-polluting 
establishment births were the most numerous during the four-year period (55,567 births).  
Sulfur dioxide-polluting establishment births ranked second in the data (38,115 births).  




Early work by Carlton (1983) and Bartik (1985) employed a conditional logit approach to 
firm level data.  This approach works well when the choice set of possible locations is 
relatively small, e.g. counties in a particular state.  However, this approach quickly 
becomes difficult to estimate as the choice set expands, e.g. when hundreds of counties 
are contained in the choice set.  A solution is proposed by Guimarães et al. (2003) 
wherein the equivalence between the likelihood function of the conditional logit and a 
Poisson regression is exploited for an easy to estimate model irrespective of the number 
of locations in the choice set.  
 
We follow Becker and Henderson (1997, 2000) and List and McHone (2000) in deriving 
the reduced-form model, using a flow concept of new births as the dependent variable, 
allowing the effects of increased stringency in environmental regulation to be captured in 
a partial equilibrium framework.  
 
The supply of entrepreneurs in any given time period is given by 
(1)   )) , ( ( it it it e X Y      
where Yit is the flow of new plants (gross births), Xit are spatial attributes that affect the 
local profit function,  , and eit is a random error component. The supply curve is upward 
sloping as an increase in per plant profit induces new births. A demand curve represents 
the change in plant profits due to an increase in births. We have 
(2)  ) ( it
d Y        13 
 
The demand curve can be positively or negatively sloped as profit can be positively 
affected by births through localization or urbanization economies, or negatively affected 
by births as new plants may have a negative impact on local output price. Intersection of 
the demand and supply functions gives a reduced-form equation 
(3)  it it it e X f Y   ) (       
where Yit is births in county i in time t; Xit is a vector of county attributes, including 
attainment status and time dummies, presumed to influence the spatial location function; 
and eit is a contemporaneous independently and identically distributed error term.  
 
As the dependent variable, new plant births, is a nonnegative integer with a high 
frequency of small numbers, Yit is modeled as a Poisson distributed random variable. The 
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where  it is the expected value of new plant births and is assumed to be a function of the 
variables specified in the model. Usually,  it takes a log-linear form to ensure nonnegative 
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Where   is a vector of unknown coefficients to be estimated and  i are unobservable 
county-specific factors that may affect the location decision. As  i  are important, we 
account for the county-specific unobservables by estimating a fixed effects panel data 
model.  In estimation, county-specific unobservables that do not vary over time are 14 
 
accounted for in the model as each unit of observation is conditioned on total births for 
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The fixed effects,  i, are therefore conditioned out of the likelihood function and are 
unrecoverable. One potentially undesirable characteristic of the Poisson model is the 
restriction that the conditional mean and variance of the dependent variable,  it, are equal. 
This can be a limiting assumption as standard errors from a Poisson model are sensitive 
to under- or over-dispersion in the data. As such, the negative binomial model is a less 
restrictive, natural alternative to the Poisson model since it allows for differences in the 
mean and variance.  
 
We gathered data on new plant births for 3,042 counties over a four-year time period 
from 1996 to 2000. We dropped 126 counties from the model due to missing county-level 
employment and income data. The remaining 2,916 counties generated 11,664 
observations to be used in the panel model. The explanatory variable of interest is 
attainment status under the federal standard for air criteria pollution, which follows 
research by Henderson (1996), Kahn (1997), Becker and Henderson (2000), and List and 
McHone (2000). More specifically, as these studies find significant effects on industry 
behavior vis-à-vis county non-attainment status with respect to their chosen air criteria 
pollutant, we follow the work by Becker (2005) by examining the firm behavioral 
impacts of non-attainment status in relation to four of the CAA’s criteria air pollutants. 
As other county-specific firm location research has included county-specific descriptors, 15 
 
we also include county-level population, manufacturing employment, and income as 
explanatory variables that we believe may influence the firm location decision (see 
Becker and Henderson 2000; List and McHone 2000; List et al. 2004b).
2 Descriptive 
statistics, definitions, and sources are shown in Table 4.  
 
Results 
Table 5 presents results from the fixed effects negative binomial models. For the four 
criteria air pollutants considered here we test the impact of county-level attainment status 
on dirty manufacturing births and non-polluters. In total we run eight models. W e are 
particularly interested in ozone non-attainment status and other location-specific effects 
on high emitter births (Model 1) due to the relative lack of progress in reducing its 
concentration levels. Also, of all the criteria pollutants, more counties have been 
designated as out-of-attainment with respect to ozone emissions and there are more 
within-county status changes over the four-year period of our data.  
As the underlying assumption within the analysis is that non-polluting or clean 
manufacturers should not be affected by attainment status, we also examine attainment 
status impacts on clean births. Before discussing the results, some preliminary 
observations are required. First, in estimation, we assume our attainment status variable 
to be strictly exogenous. We recognize the potential for endogeneity of our attainment 
status variable. That is, new pollution-intensive firm births in year t in county i can push 
                                                 
2 In an earlier version of the analysis, we also gathered data on county-level highway expenditures and 
property tax revenues to estimate and include an effective property tax variable. Unfortunately, consistent 
data are not available for all counties across all years.  For example, the quinquennial survey of government 
finances takes place in years ending in two and seven (e.g. 1992, 1997, and 2002).  In these survey years all 
counties are surveyed.  During the intervening years only a subset of counties are sampled:  counties with 
populations greater than 100,000.  In order to estimate a balanced panel, we did not include county-level 
highway expenditures or effective property taxes in the model. 16 
 
the county into out-of-attainment with respect to air quality levels in year t + 1. We 
follow List and McHone (2000) and empirically check for endogeneity by comparing the 
model results with those using lagged attainment status values. The coefficients don’t 
change significantly, indicating that endogeneity isn’t a serious issue with our data. 
Second, for all models we performed the Hausman test statistic to test the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are the same as 
the ones estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator.  For all models we reject the 
null, indicating that a fixed effects model is appropriate.  
 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 present the impact of ozone attainment on ozone-intensive 
plant births.  The results shed some interesting insight into the impact of air quality 
regulation on firm location behavior. For pollution-intensive manufacturers, the results 
provide evidence that births are deterred by increased regulatory costs. Recall, plants 
locating within counties that are designated as being out-of-attainment with regard to the 
federal standards for ozone are subject to the Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (LAER) 
on equipment, and this is enforced without consideration of cost to the firm. This is in 
contrast to new plants locating within in-attainment counties that are subject to less 
restrictive start-up costs. The coefficient on the attainment status variable is negative and 
significant at the 10 percent confidence level. This estimate suggests that the expected 
number of pollution-intensive plant openings decreases by approximately 9 percent each 
year that a county is designated as out-of-attainment with respect to ozone standards. 
Compared to other research, our result is slightly smaller than Henderson’s (1996) 
finding in which a county’s out-of-attainment status deters expected births of new plastic 17 
 
manufacturing plants by between 11 to 12 percent. Based on our results, each county 
reports 2.2 new ozone pollution-intensive plant births each year on average, which 
represents a decrease of 0.19 expected births per year for counties designated as out-of-
attainment with respect to ozone standards.  This is somewhat smaller than List and 
McHone’s (2000) finding that non-attainment status decreases the expected flow of dirty 
manufacturing births by 0.88 between 1985 and 1990 in New York State. However, it is 
in line with the results of List et al. (2004a) that translate the attainment status parameter 
in a fixed effects Poisson model into an expected loss of 0.14-0.20 new domestic-owned 
plants between 1980 and 1990. The policy implication of our finding is that, as an 
unintended consequence of the CAAA 1977, differences in the federal standards for 
ozone may cause a spatial browning process as more stringent air quality regulations 
affect capital flows of pollution-intensive plants.  
 
In terms of the location-specific variables in Model 1, on the demand side, an area’s 
population positively influences the capital flows of polluting plants. This perhaps 
suggests that firms are attracted to higher populated counties to take advantage of labor 
market economies by sharing a common labor pool. The number of manufacturing 
employees is also positive, albeit insignificant.  Higher personal income deters ozone 
pollution-intensive births. While empirical evidence regarding income effects on plant 
births is not conclusive our result lends support for environmental justice concerns that 
polluting manufacturers locate plants in disproportionately poor areas.  
 18 
 
In Model 2, we examine the relationship between environmental regulatory stringency 
and capital flows of non-polluting, or clean manufacturers. We hypothesize that while the 
LAER on equipment imposes significant private compliance costs on dirty plants, 
environmental stringency should not influence the location decision of clean plants. The 
attainment status is insignificant, suggesting that, in contrast to polluting plants, a 
county’s ozone attainment status has no impact on the location decision of clean plants. 
This implies that the regulatory costs imposed on new plants locating in out-of-attainment 
counties are not a significant component of the location decision for clean plants.  
 
We also examine non-attainment status and other location-specific effects vis-à-vis PT, 
CO, and SO2 (Becker 2005). Models 3 and 4 consider the impact of attainment status with 
respect to PT on dirty and clean births respectively. Again the attainment status 
coefficient is negative and significant; counties designated as out of attainment with 
regard to PT deter births of manufacturing plants considered to be high emitters of PT. 
While Becker (2005) did not consider location effects, this result lends support to his 
finding that PT non-attainment is more likely to impact capital and operating cost 
expenditures for high emitting firms. Interestingly, based on Model 4 results, the 
additional expenditures incurred also seem to deter clean births—although the coefficient 
is much smaller.  Income is again negative and significant, which suggests higher income 
areas are less likely to attract PT-producing firms than low income areas.  
 
While Models 5 and 7 indicate that county-level attainment status in regard to CO and 
SO2 negatively impacts the location behavior of high emitters of the respective criteria 19 
 
pollutants, the coefficients are insignificant. This may be due to a relatively low national 
priority toward regulating high emitters of CO and SO2, or perhaps due to the lack of 
within-county attainment changes. This result is consistent with Becker (2005) who also 
finds that non-attainment status with regard to CO has no impact on capital expenditures 
of high emitters and is actually less likely to affect operating costs.  
 
Conclusion
We investigate whether federal air quality standards impact capital flows. Under the 1977 
CAA, new plants locating in counties designated as out-of-attainment of the federal 
standards for six criteria air pollutants face stricter regulations. As the regulation is 
enforced without any cost consideration to the firm, this can impose significant start-up 
costs. As such, the intuition is that heterogeneous regulatory stringency could play a 
major role in a firm’s location decision. While earlier research typically finds an 
insignificant or, at best, a marginal relationship between regulatory standards and capital 
flows, more recent research provides statistical support for this hypothesis. We use a 
newly available panel data set of county-level manufacturing plant births between 1996 
and 2000. The focus of the paper is on ozone attainment effects as due to the relative lack 
of progress in reducing its concentration levels ozone has received the most attention 
from regulators. Further our data reveal that more counties have been designated as out-
of-attainment with respect to ozone emissions and there are more within-county status 
changes over the four-year period. We find that more stringent air quality regulations 
with respect to ozone deter births of pollution-intensive plants. This supports the idea that 
asymmetrical spatial environmental standards may create a spatial browning process. The 20 
 
underlying assumption is that if dirty plants are deterred from locating in out-of-
attainment counties due to the high start-up costs imposed, spatial differences should not 
influence the capital flows of clean plants. Results from a second model on non pollution-
intensive manufacturers support this hypothesis, finding that attainment status with 
respect to ozone has no statistical effect on clean plant births.   
Finally, we examine the impact of increased regulatory standards with respect to PT, CO, 
and SO2 on dirty and clean births. Our results indicate that increased regulatory standards 
related to PT deter both high and low PT emitter births and are statistically significant.  
Increased regulatory standards related to high emitter CO or SO2 births are negatively 
related to establishment births, but are not statistically significant.  21 
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Appendix 1. High Emitters of Criteria Air Pollutants (SIC Code) 
 





























Table 1 - States with the Highest County-level Non-attainment Status 
Ozone  Carbon Monoxide  Sulfur Dioxide  Particulates 
Pennsylvania (44)  California (22)  Minnesota (8)  California (15) 
California (27)  New Jersey (14)  Ohio (7)  Colorado (11) 
Ohio (25)  Colorado (9)  Indiana (5)  Montana (7) 
New York (22)  Minnesota (8)  Arizona (4)  Arizona (7) 
New Jersey (20)  New York (7)  Pennsylvania (3)  Washington (6) 
Total (325)  Total (112)  Total (45)  Total (78) 
Table 2 - Rank of Establishment births by County by Type of Birth, 1996-2000 
Rank  All Births  Ozone  Carbon Monoxide Sulfur  Dioxide  Particulates 
1  Los Angeles, Ca  Los Angeles, Ca  Los Angeles, Ca  Los Angeles, Ca  Los Angeles, Ca 
2  Cook, Il  New York, Ny  Orange, Ca  Orange, Ca  Orange, Ca 
3  New York, Ny  Cook, Il  Cook, Il  Cook, Il  Harris, Tx 
4  Harris, Tx  Orange, Ca  Harris, Tx  Harris, Tx  Cook, Il 
5  Maricopa, Az  Maricopa, Az  Maricopa, Az  San Diego, Ca  San Diego, Ca 
6  Orange, Ca  Harris, Tx  Sandiego, Ca  Maricopa, Az  Maricopa, Az 
7  Sandiego, Ca  Sandiego, Ca  Dallas, Tx  Dallas, Tx  Dallas, Tx 
8  Dallas, Tx  Dallas, Tx  Broward, Fl  New York, Ny  King, Wa 
9  King, Wa  King, Wa  Newyork, Ny  King, Wa  Broward, Fl 
10 Broward,  Fl  Broward, Fl  King, Wa  Broward, Fl  New York, Ny 
 
 
Table 3 - Establishment Births by Industry 1996-2000 
Polluting Industry  Number of Establishment Births 
Ozone 27,830 
Carbon Monoxide  24,694 
Sulfur Dioxide  38,115 
Particulates 55,567 28 
 
Table 4 – Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 







Count of new ozone pollution-
intensive plants from 1996 to 2000.  
 







Count of new ozone clean plant 
births from 1996 to 2000. 
 








Count of new PT pollution-intensive 
plants from 1996 to 2000.  
 
Census Statistics of U.S. 
Businesses 
Non-pollution-
intensive plants (PT) 
12.28 
(64.11) 
Count of new clean PT plant births 
from 1996 to 2000. 
 










Count of new CO pollution-
intensive plants from 1996 to 2000.  
 
 
Census Statistics of U.S. 
Businesses 
Non-pollution-
intensive plants (CO) 
14.77 
(70.21) 
Count of new clean CO plant births 
from 1996 to 2000. 
Census Statistics of U.S. 
Businesses 






Count of new SO2 pollution-
intensive plants from 1996 to 2000.  
 
Census Statistics of U.S. 
Businesses 
Non-pollution-
intensive plants (SO2) 
13.69 
(66.20) 
Count of new clean SO2 plant births 
from 1996 to 2000. 
 
Census Statistics of U.S. 
Businesses 





Dichotomous variable = 1 if county 
is out-of-attainment of federal 
standards for ozone, 0 otherwise. 
 
Federal Register Title 40 





Dichotomous variable = 1 if county 
is out-of-attainment of federal 
standards for PT, 0 otherwise. 
 
Federal Register Title 40 





Dichotomous variable = 1 if county 
is out-of-attainment of federal 
standards for CO, 0 otherwise. 
 
Federal Register Title 40 





Dichotomous variable = 1 if county 
is out-of-attainment of federal 
standards for SO2, 0 otherwise. 
 
Federal Register Title 40 
CFR Part 81.305. 
Population 87.69 
(287.98) 
County population (1,000s) 
 
County Business Patterns 
 
      
Employment 6.52 
(21.78) 
Total manufacturing employment  
(1000s) 
County Business Patterns 
      
Income 2,287,639 
(8,416,989) 
County personal income (1,000s)  Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 29 
 
Table 5 - Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Model 
 
 Ozone  PT CO  SO2 

















Constant 26.414**  0.799  12.120 5.634** 5.728  1.891  17.306  1.725 
  4.188  1.509 164.243 1.742  4.786  1.568 143.648 1.600 




-0.066 0.032 -0.014  0.041** 
  0.053  0.031 0.208 0.136 0.050 0.031 0.026 0.022 
ln(pop) 2.109** 0.267 -0.279  0.816**  -0.704 0.258 -0.014 0.230 
  0.462  0.176 0.407 0.200 0.547 0.181 0.498 0.186 
ln(empl) 0.233 0.176**  -0.020 0.086 -0.160  0.226**  0.103  0.234** 
  0.151  0.049 0.092 0.059 0.142 0.052 0.119 0.053 
ln(inc) -2.179**  0.033  0.481*  -
0.509** 
0.381 -0.063 0.047 -0.051 















  0.028  0.014 0.017 0.020 0.026 0.016 0.021 0.017 







  0.044  0.019 0.030 0.024 0.046 0.020 0.037 0.021 







  0.058  0.023 0.040 0.028 0.060 0.024 0.048 0.025 
           
Log Lik.  -7336  -17912  14687  -17918  -7975  -17919  -16314  -16315 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*Denotes significance at the 10 percent level 
** Denotes significance at the 5 percent level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 